Burns Holdings v. Madison County Bd. Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 33753 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-25-2008
Burns Holdings v. Madison County Bd. Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 33753
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Burns Holdings v. Madison County Bd. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 33753" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1553.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1553
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Appellant, 
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33753 
Madison County District 
Court Case No. CV-05-255 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
. . .  , 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Madison 
Honorable Brent J. Moss, Presiding 
Donald L. Harris, Esq. (ISB # 1969) 
Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB # 701 8) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P. 0. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive Avenue, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Troy D. Evans 
MADISON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 350 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: (208) 356-7768 
Facsimile: (208) 356-7839 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CORRECTIONS TO CLAIMS IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF FACTS 
ALLEGEDLY IN THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 2  
11. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
A. The County Has Not Articulated Its Standard on Each Issue in Relation to the Burns 
and Walters Applications, but Instead Has Only Argued that the Locations of the 
Properties Justified the Application of Two Different Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
B. Corrections to Claims Made by the County Which It Erroneously Alleges Are 
Supported by the Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
1. The City of Rexburg Did Not Claim That the Location of Commercial 
Property Did Not Conform to the Present General Principles for Change at 
the North Interchange. The Burns Proposal Does Conform to These 
Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
2. The Madison County Comprehensive Plan Does Not Contain Differing 
Standards for the South, Middle, and North Interchanges. . . . . . . . . . . .  15 
3. Traffic and Safety Were Issues Raised in the Walters Hearing. . . . . . . .  17 
4. The Commission's Claim That Six Industrial Properties Already Existed in 
the Areas Surrounding the Walters Property Is Not Accurate. . . . . . . .  .20  
5. The Walters Property Is Not Located Within the City Limits of the City of 
Rexburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23 
6. The Commission's Claim That Mr. Pline's Report Appears to Have Been 
Prepared Prior to the Decision of Burns to Add Commercial Businesses to the 
Site Is Not Supported by the Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 2 5  
7. Pline Did Not "Ignore the Warnings of Mr. Dyer," Who Prepared an Earlier 
Assessment of the North Interchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 2 7  
C. Without Substantiating Evidence from Those Testifying at Hearings on the Burns 
Matter, the Principle Articulated in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia 
County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002) Was Not Followed. . . . . . . . . . .  . 2 8  
D. A Substantial Right of Burns Has Been Prejudiced. A Takings Analysis Is Not the 
Proper Analysis for Determination of Whether a Substantial Right ofBurns Has Been 
Violated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33 
. . . . . .  E. Approval of the Burns Application Would Not Be an Illegal Spot Zone. 39 
F. Bums, and Not the Commission, Is Entitled to An Award of Attorney's Fees . . 44 
111. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page i 
TABLE OF AUTHOIRBTIES 
CASES 
Evans v . Board of Commissioners of 
Cassia County. 137 Idaho 428. 50 P.3d 443 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .28.31.35.37. 45 
Evans v . Teton County. 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003) . . . . . .  14.20. 3 1.34.35.38.41.42. 44 
Friend ofFarm to Market v . Valley County. 137 Idaho 192. 46 P.3d 9 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33 
Lane Ranch Partnership v . City ofSun Valley. 137 Idaho 428. 50 P.3d 443 (2002) . . . .  35-37. 45 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v . Valley County. 2007 W L  4531 786 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44 
Price v . Payette County Board of County 
Commissioners. 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
Sanders Orchard v . Gem County. 137 Idaho 695. 52 P.3d 840 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .34.35. 37 
Sprenger. Grubb andAssociates. Inc . v . City 
ofHailey. 127 Idaho 576. 903 P.2d 741 (S . Ct . 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
Urruita v . Blaine County. 134 Idaho 353. 2 P.3d 738 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22.23. 41 
STATUTES 
I.C.567-5279(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34, 36 
I.C.§67.6535(~) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6,32 
I.C.512-117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44, 45 
I.C.§67.5279(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34 
I.C.567-6508. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
I.C.467-6511 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41, 42 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
McQuillan's Municipal Corporations 3 25.84 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42 
Michael S . Gilmore & Dale D . Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure 
Act: A Primer for the Practitioner. 30 Idaho L . Rev . 273. 366 (199311994) . . . . . . . .  7. 9 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page ii 
I. CORRECTIONS TO CLAIMS IN RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF OF FACTS ALLEGEDLY IN THE RECORD 
Before responding to the arguments made by the Madison County Board of County 
Commissioners' (the "County" or "Commission"') in their "Respondent's Brief', it is unfortunately 
necessary to correct certain factual claims made by the Commission as to items in the record before 
this Court. The claims made by the Commission that require correction are set forth in the following 
table in the order they appear in Respondent's Brief. The correction from the record is set forth in 
the neighboring column, and as to some of the claims made by the Commission, further discussed 
in the Argument section of this brief: 
1 We regret that the County has referred to the Madison County Planning and Zoning Commission as the 
"Commission" in its "Respondent's Brief." Burns has referred to the Madison County Board of County Commissioners as the 
"Commission" in its briefing. To stay consistent with the "Appellant's Opening Brief," Burns will continue to refer to the 
Madison County Board of County Commissioners as the "Commission" in  this brief. 
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CLAIM MADE BY COUNTY 
"Among other opposition, the City of 
Rexburg appeared and requested that it be 
denied because it did not conform to the 
general principals for change at the north area 
of the county."' 
"Significantly, the Order and record are 
absent of any statements raised by Burns in its 
Appellant's Opening Brief, dated December 
3,2007, pp. 6-9, as to what Judge Moss said 
or did not say while in  chamber^."^ 
"On April 13,2006, the Board met for the 
purpose to again completely review the Bums 
hearing (as well as Walters) . . . The Board 
also reviewed the Walters matter they heard 
before the Burns matter on February 28,2005 
316 
. . . 
CORRECTION FROM THE RECORD 
After the County specifically requested 
comments from the City of Rexburg on an 
application submitted by Mr. Bruce Shirley in 
2003 that would affect the Bums parcel then 
owned by Gayle Taylor (previous to when 
Gayle Taylor and Burns submitted their 
applications), the City of Rexburg's attorncy 
provided the following comments at the 
planning and zoning meeting on the Shirley 
application: "Mr. Zollinger stated that he 
represented the City of Rexburg and had been 
asked to give their input regarding this 
proposed zone change. This proposed 
Commercial Zone Change does conform to 
the present general principles for change at 
the North area of the county, . . ."3 For 
further discussion, see Section 1I.B. I below. 
In Judge Moss's October 17, 2006 written 
decision, Judge Moss awarded attorney's fees 
because "of the Board's obvious 
misinterpretation of evidence in the record . . . 
and a possible conflict of interest issue that 
one of the Board members may have had."5 
The Walters matter was not discussed at the 
April 13,2006 meeting in any way. The 
complete transcript is in the record for this 
Court's re vie^.^ 
2 Respondent's Brief at 1. 
3 R. Vol. 4 Burns 2 at 3. 
4 Respondent's Brief at fn. 44. 
5 R. Vol. 1 at 505. 
6 Respondent's Brief at 7. 
7 R. Exhibit, Public Meeting, REBurn's[sic] Holdings, LLC, April 13, 2006. 
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County is aware of the acreage at the site, and 
the middle interchanges have differently. The south and middle 
north does not. The fact is, seeing as the 
as are the proposed uses, the comprehensive 
one already working gravel pit."" only one portion of one property is zoned 
industrial. Also, the businesses described by 
the Commission are nearly all commercial 
8 Respondent's Brief at 14. 
9 See Appendix D at p. 4 (Issue: Quality and Quantity of Farm Ground to Be Developed) attached to Appellant's 
Opening Brief 
10 Respondent's Brief a1 15 .  
I 1  Id at 16. 
12 Id. 
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13 Id at 16-17. 
14 Id at 24. 
15 Id. at 25. 
16 Id at 26. 
17 R. Exhibit Public Hearing RE Burns Holdings. LLC, Request for Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28,2005, 
at p.89, LL. I through p.90, LL. 17. 
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compliance with the Comprehensive Plan."I3 further discussion, see 
undertook specific action to address his 
recommendations. For further discussion, se 
"Mr. Cureton had been requested to perform a 
traffic study on the site and report his findings 
at the hearing."I6 
Mr. Cureton performed a traffic &, not a 
traffic studg, and his numbers were 
consistent with the numbers Mr. Pline used in 
his analysis and with the Keller Report." 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The County Has Not Articulated Its Standard on Each Issue in Relation to the 
Burns and Walters Applications, but Instead IJas Only Argued that the 
Locations of the Properties Justified the Application of Two Different 
Standards. 
When viewed as a whole, the Commission's treatment of Burns Holdings, LLC ("Burns") 
and its application was results-oriented and fundamentally unfair under the Local Land Use Planning 
Act (the "LLUPA"). While it has been necessary to explain, often in significant detail, the specific 
issues that have been raised in this appeal, the overarching principle governing this court's review 
is contained in the LLUPA: 
It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to [the LLUPA] should 
be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized principles of 
law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the state are directed to consider the 
proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant 
decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making.'* 
The purpose of this principle of fundamental fairness is to provide every person or entity 
appearing before a governmental zoning board the right to equal and fair treatment under the law. 
It is to prevent local prejudices, special interests, and exclusionary tactics from interfering with 
orderly growth and development. All applicants, whether domestic, such as Walters Ready-Mix 
("Walters"), or from out of the area, such as Burns, are to be accorded the same fair treatment. The 
court's review of the Burns decision must be focused on principles of fairness and reasonableness 
and constitutional principles of due process. This scope of review is best explained as follows: 
18 IDAHO CODE 5 67-6535(c) (emphasis added). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 6 
Judicial review-be it of law-declaring, factfinding, law-applying, or discretion- 
exercising acts by agencies-returns repeatedly to the fundamental question of 
whether the agency action was reasonable. In evaluating the law-declaring function 
the issue is-at least once the agency's interpretation has been found to be a 
permissible one-whether the agency's decision reasonably advances the legislative 
goals. In reviewing facts as found by the agency the issue is the reasonableness of 
the inferences, credibility evaluations, persuasive impact, and the like: did the agency 
reasonably sift and weigh the information; In the law-applying and discretion- 
exercising judgments the questions focus on the reasonableness of the agency's 
decision processes and the reasons it offers for its  decision^.'^ 
As explained in Burns' opening brief, and as set forth further below, the Commission's 
findings of fact and conclusions were not supported by the record, and given the fortuitous decision 
on a nearly identical proposal from Walters-the sole source of concrete in Madison County- issued 
at the exact same time as the Burns decision, the comparison of these two decisions provides this 
court with a unique opportunity to juxtapose these decisions and determine whether the same 
standards were applied to both parties. They were not, and Respondent's Brief has failed to explain 
or justify the Comtnission's fact-finding and its inapposite application of standards to the Burns and 
Walters applications. 
The Commission argues that the Burns and Walters properties are "drastically differentsz0 
and that "the problem with the residents and the [Commission] was largely Bums' location."21 
Based on the provisions of the Madison County Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan), and on 
past Madison County practices-which is the best indication of how Madison County has interpreted 
19 Michael S .  Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Adminisfralive Procedure Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 
IDAHO L. REV. 273, 366 (199311994) [hereinafter "Gilmore & Goble"]. Tile LLUPA adopts the judicial review provisions of the 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (the "IDAPA") for review of zoning board decisions. When judicial review of LLUPA 
decisions is undertaken, "a local agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is treated as a 
government agency under IDAPA." 
20 Respondent's Brief at 15. 
21 Id. at 17. 
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its Comprehensive Plan-the location was ideal. But even if we assume that the location was not 
ideal, a difference in property location is not a legitimate reason for applying different standards. 
Safety at one site should be evaluated by the same standard as applied to another location. Effect 
on property values at one site should be evaluated by same standard as applied to another location, 
and so on. In sum, standards ensure that analysis is consistent, and, without the application of 
standards, decision-making is haphazard and capricious. 
The Madison County Planning and Zoning Board (hereinafter "Planning and Zoning") 
recognized these standards and properly evaluated the Bums application, approving it with a six to 
one vote after Planning and Zoning worked with Bums to revise its previous application. 
Conversely, the Commission applied no standards in its decision-making in this matter, but was 
instead ad hoc rather than consistent and logical. This is evidenced by undertaking the simple task 
of articulating the County's "standards" on each issue in light of both the Burns and Walters 
decisions. 
In Respondent's Brief, the Commission did not address Bums' primary argument that the 
County cannot lawfully apply differing standards on substantially identical issues in this matter. Nor 
did the County articulate its standard on any single issue, but instead recounted the facts surrounding 
the Bums and Walters applications in what appears to be an attempt to circumvent any explanation 
of the County's methods and standards in its decision-making. As this Court is aware, when 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 8 
determining whether or not an alleged action is arbitrary and capricious, "the focus of this inquiry 
is on the methods by which the agency arrived at its decision . . . ."" 
If the Commission can survive the arbitrary and capricious standard contained in the LLUPA 
simply by pointing out that two properties differ in their location-which, of course, will always be 
the case with two different properties-then the LLUPA would provide no meaningful recourse for 
results-oriented decisions made by land use bodies. This kind of decision-making violates not only 
principles of fundamental fairness, which is the emphasis of the LLUPA, but also specifically 
violates the arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards contained therein. 
The County's strategy in defending its decision on the Bums application appears to be to list 
all of the facts surrounding both applications with the hope that one of those factual differences will 
be enough for this Court to uphold the Commission's decision, rather than focus on the standards 
it applied to both. However, in doing so, the County has unfortunately misstated the record in 
regards to some important issues, which must be addressed. These misstatements are noted in the 
table contained in the above section, but some of the misstatements require the explanation provided 
in the following Section B. 
22 Gilmore & Goble at 365. 
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B. Corrections to Claims Made by the County Which It Erroneously Alleges Are 
Supported by the Record. 
1. The City of Rexburg Did Not Claim That the Location of Commercial 
Property Did Not Conform to the Present General Principles for Change 
at the North Interchange. The Burns Proposal Does Conform to These 
Principles. 
On the first page of Respondent's Brief, the Commission argued that when Gayle Taylor 
submitted an application for a zone change at the north interchange of Highway 20 (hereinafter, the 
"North Interchange") for commercial use, the City of Rexburg supported the Commission's 
conclusion that the application did not conform to the general principles for growth at the North 
Interchange. This claim is not accurate for two reasons: (1) It is not an accurate statement from the 
record, and (2) the comments from the City of Rexburg were not made in conjunction with an 
application submitted by Gayle Taylor; rather, they were comments provided in conjunction with a 
previous application submitted by Mr. Bruce Shirley. In Respondent's Brief, the Commission has 
confused these two proceedings and combined elements of both. 
In 2003, Mr. Bruce Shirley submitted a request to amend the Comprehensive Plan and for 
a zone change for an area running from theNorth Interchange, along Highway 20, for approximately 
two miles to the Teton Lakes Golf Course, which involved numerous properties and was 
significantly larger in size and scope than the Burns proposal. A small portion of the entire property 
proposed for rezone was the Bums parcel, which was owned by Gayle Taylor at the time, and Ms. 
Taylor's entire parcel was proposed to be changed to commercial zoning. Minutes from the hearing 
before the Commission on this matter are found in the record at R. Vol. 4 Bums 2, which contains 
testimony from Bruce Shirley, Gayle Taylor, and Stephen Zollinger. It was in conjunction with this 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- Page 10 
application from Bruce Shirley that the County requested comments from the City of Rexburg. 
Rexburg's City Attorney Stephen Zollinger stated that "he represented the City of Rexburg and had 
been asked to give their input regarding this proposed zone change. This proposed Commercial 
Zone Change does conform to the present general principles for change at the North area of the 
county, . . ."23 Thus, the claim made in Respondent's Brief that the City of Rexburg has claimed that 
commercial zoning does not conform to present general principles for change at the North 
Interchange is not accurate. 
It is also important to note that the application was submitted by Mr. Shirley, not Gayle 
Taylor. Thus, Ms. Taylor never submitted an application to rezone the entire property commercial, 
which the Commission has claimed in Respondent's Brief. Even though the Shirley application was 
denied by the Commi~sion:~ the City of Rexburg has never changed its position with regards to the 
location of commercial property at the North Interchange in any of the proceedings following on 
Bums' application. 
Because a rezone of entirely commercial property was not acceptable to the Conmission, 
Gayle Taylor thereafter filed an application to change the Comprehensive Plan and zoning 
ordinances with regards to her entire property to light industrial. Even though the Madison County 
Planning and Zoning Commission ("Planning and Zoning") favorably recommended the requested 
industrial change with a four to three vote:' the Commission denied the requested change.26 Thus, 
23 R. Vol. 4 Burns 2 at 3. 
24 R. Vol. 4 Burns 2 at 4. 
25 R. Vol. 4 Burns 4 at 7, 9. 
26 R. Voi. 4 Bums 7 at 29. 
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the Commission denied an application to rezone the property as entirely commercial and an 
application to rezone the property entirely industrial. 
Because neither a proposal to rezone the entire property as commercial or industrial was 
acceptable to the County, Planning and Zoning suggested a proposal to develop a small industrial 
parcel buffered with commercial property.27 Acting in accordance with these suggestions, Burns, 
now the owner ofthe Taylor property, requested azone change for the property from Transitional-Ag 
2 to a combined industriallcommercia1 parcel of twelve acres of light industrial zoned land to 
construct a concrete batch plant, which was buffered by 37 acres of commercial property." After 
reviewing the Burns application, it was recommended for approval by Planning and Zoning with a 
6-1 vote.29 
After years of working with Madison County, it appeared that the appropriate combination 
of commercial and industrial uses was proposed at the North Interchange acceptable to Planning and 
Zoning and apparently also to the City of Rexburg, because it did not appear to contest or change its 
previous position that location of commercial property on the North Interchange was appropriate. 
Unfortunately, the Commission did not approve the Burns application, even with Bums' 
efforts of working with Madison County to propose a configuration satisfactory to both and in 
compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. The Commission has even gone so far as to argue that 
approval ofthe Burns application would "require a substantial rewrite ofthe existing Comprehensive 
27 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLC Request for Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p. 99, LL. 23 through p.100, LL. 1-2. 
28 R. Vol. 4. Burns 12. 
29 R. Vol. 4 Burns 17; R. Vol. 4 Burns 22. The only vote against the Bums application was from Millie Andrus, 
which is explained in detail in Appellant's Opening Brief at 6 and footnote 15 of that brief. 
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Plan, including the modification of underlying goals and objectives of the Plan."3o The Commission 
is alone is making this argument, one that is contrary to the position of Planning and Zoning and the 
City of Rexburg. This position further demonstrates the results-oriented nature of the Con~mission's 
decision on the Burns application. 
Remarkably, even as far back as 2003, the members of the Commission acknowledged that 
the North Interchange was destined to developed ~ommercially,~' and reemphasized this position in 
2005: 
Because of my comments everybody has heard here throughout the testimony that I've 
always seen that as a commercial area and regardless of how may residents are going to live 
there, you're going to have commercial developed at that site.32 
The Burns application does comport with the general principles contained in the 
Comprehensive Plan. The development of the Bums site would (1) "maintain[] viable tracts of 
prime agricultural land,"33 (2) protect "farm to market roadP4 by limiting industrial and commercial 
traffic on these roads because of the Burns site's close proximity to a state highway, (3) locate 
commercial zoning "along or within the area of the highway corridors" because "[c]ommercial use 
in Madison County has traditionally been located along the state highways and in the Rexburg 
30 R. Vol. 4 Burns 29 at 41 
3 1 See R. Vol. 4 Burns 2 at 4: "Commissioner Passey said that he felt that along Hwy 20 would become Commercial 
in the future planning of the County. . ." 
32 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLCRequestfor Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p. 99, LL. 23-25 to p.lOO, LL. 1-2. 
33 R. Exhibit 18 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan), at 15. 
34 Id. at 22. The Bums parcel is very close to the North Interchange of Highway 20 where its traffic would not impact 
traffic in rural areas. The Walters property is located miles away from an interchange at Highway 20 and requires use of 4700 
South to access the South Yellowstone Highway in order to access Highway 20. 
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area,"3* and (4) group industrial uses36 by placing the Burns site next to the Corneilson gravel pit 
located in Madison County and the industrial uses located south of the North Interchange either 
within the City of Rexburg or its impact area. The Bums proposal complies with these provisions, 
as well as past County practices at its interchanges. Overall, it does comply with general principles 
of growth and development at the North Interchange, and further, was proposed by Burns because 
Planning and Zoning suggested that it do so. 
In sum, only the Commission determined that thc Burns application did not comport to the 
general principles of growth for the North Interchange as contained in the Comprehensive Plan. 
Both the City of Rexburg and Planning and Zoning believe this type of development is consistent 
with general principles of growth in the North Interchange area. Indeed, Planning and Zoning even 
made the suggestion to buffer the industrial property with commercial property. This court has 
previously upheld a decision on a challenge to a comprehensive plan amendment in Evans v. Teton 
County, noting that "[tlhe record indicates throughout this process Teton Springs adjusted its 
application in order to meet the requirements demanded by the Zoning Cornmis~ion."~~ Bums 
worked similarly. 
Even if Walters should not have been approved, Bums should have been approved because 
it meets the standards contained in the Comprehensive Plan. The Commission's claim that Bums 
would require a substantial rewrite of the Comprehensive Plan, which the Commission is alone in 
making, is without merit, results-oriented, and arbitrary and capricious. 
35 R. Exhibit 18 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan) at 16. 
36 Id. at 17. 
37 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,77,73 P.3d 84,90 (2003). 
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2. The Madison County Comprehensive Plan Does Not Contain Differing 
Standards for the South, Middle, and North Interchanges. 
In its briefing, the Commission correctly acknowledges that there are three interchanges that 
are commonly used to access the City of Rexburg: the South Interchange, the middle interchange, 
and the North Interchange, all of which are on Highway 20. The Commission is also correct that the 
south and the middle interchanges have commercial/industria1 uses around them, but that the North 
Interchange does not.38 In its briefing, however, the Commission failed to inentfon that industrial 
and commercial properties are also present at the location of a proposed state interchange at 
Thornton, which is located south of the South Interchange, and is currently an open access to 
Highway 20 without an overpass inter~hange.~~ At the April 13,2006 public hearing, Commissioner 
Muir made the following comment: 
If we look at here down Main Street we have commercial areas developed off of that 
interchange definitely. If we look at the next interchange to the south, we have 
commercial areas around it and we have two industrial areas because we have potato 
plants that are complementing each other in that area. If we go further south to 
Thornton, we have industrial areas coming off of those interchanges with some 
c~mmerc ia l .~~  
While the Coculty is correct in its description of commercial and industrial properties surrounding 
all of the interchanges along Highway 20 (except for the North Interchange), the Commission 
thereafter incorrectly claims the following: 
38 Respondent's Brief at 15. 
39 If constructed, the Thornton interchange would truly be the gateway into Madison County for those traveling north 
on Highway 20. 
40 R. Exhibit, Public Meeting, RE Burn's [sic] Ifoldings, LLC, April 13,2006, p. 37, LL.3-11. 
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The fact is, seeing as the applicants' locations are drastically different, as are the 
proposed uses, the comprehensive plan treats them differentl~."~' 
The Madison County Comprehensive Plan does not contain differing standards for the North 
Interchange from the middle and south interchanges, and therefore, does not treat them differently. 
The entire Comprehensive Plan is in the record for this Court's review, and the Comprehensive Plan 
contains no specific standards relative to the County's  interchange^.^^ 
In addition, the proposed uses of Bums and Walters are not "drastically different." Both 
applications requested land use changes from agricultural-type zoning to industrial zoning 
surrou~lded with a commercial buffer. This claim by the Commission is not supported with 
information from the record. In fact, it is clear that Madison County has established a practice of 
locating commercial and industrial zones around its Highway 20 interchanges. Such an approach 
is supported by the Comprehensive Plan and has been followed historically. The Burns proposal 
comported with this practice, while the Walters proposal (which is not located near an interchange) 
did not. Clearly, however, the Comprehensive Plan does not contain differing standards for the three 
major interchanges on Highway 20 which access the City of Rexburg. Burns therefore does not 
understand, nor has the Commission ever explained, why Bums and Walters were treated differently 
on this issue. 
41 Respondent's Brief at 15. 
42 R. Exhibit 18 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan). 
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3. . Traffic and Safety Were Issues Raised in the Walters Hearing. 
Instead of addressing the County's application of opposite standards on traffic and safety 
relative to Burns and Walters, the County instead argues that traffic and safety was not an issue in 
the Walters hearing. Specifically, the County argues that "no concerns were voiced regarding the 
location access due to traffic volume, sight restrictions or vehicle speed, all of which were major 
issues in the Bums' hearing."43 
The record does not support the Commission's claim that "no concerns" were voiced at the 
Walters' hearings relative to traffic issues. The following individuals either testified or indicated 
their concern about traffic associated with the Walters proposal at both the Planning and Zoning 
meeting and the Commission meetings on Walters: Lewis Cameron, Kort Black, Georgia Hansen, 
Joel Jenkins, Frank Jenkins, Christian Nelson, Lou Cameron, Ken Anderson, Jeff Andrew, Heather 
Rich, and Lori H a n ~ e n . ~ ~  As examples, consider the following statements made by Heather Rich and 
Lori Hansen: 
My second main concern is traffic flow. I commute down - is it 4700?. . . There are 
school children that stand on that street and are dropped from school buses. It's very 
narrow. I have been down that road many times with all ofthe semi's that go down 
and are carrying to the existing gravel pit and it is very dangerous. It's even 
dangerous to be on the road in a vehicle, let alone with children on the road. That's 
one of my biggest concerns. In part of this global planning and global design there 
is no consideration of expanding the road, no consideration of those that live on that 
road and that's one of my big  concern^.^' 
43 Respondent's Brief at 16. 
44 R. Vol. 4 Waiters 8, 10, 11 
45 R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE: Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28, 2005, p.37, LL.1- 
14. 
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On Cameron Lane alone, we have 35 children. This is one street, one cul-de-sac. 
We live on the Lyman-Archer Highway, we border it. The Edstrom's trucks go up 
and down and up and down. They make me nervous. I am not looking forward to 
more trucks and gravel up and down, and up and down on 4700 South really does 
scare me.46 
In addition, County residents suggested that Walters construct a road through the middle of 
its property so that both the Walters trucks and the trucks from neighboring Edstrom's gravel pit 
could use this road and avoid 4700 S o ~ t h . ~ '  The suggestions made by these residents speaks for 
themselves with regards to the concerns residents had concerning traffic. Ultimately, Walters 
refused to consider construction of such a road.48 
Further, it is contrary to the record for the Commission to make the argument that traffic and 
safety were not concerns at the Walters hearing because, at the time the Walters decision was made, 
concerns were raised by citizens and the Commission itself that the location of where to construct 
the new interchange at Thornton had not been decided. In fact, Walters had not even specified where 
its ingress or egress onto its property would be located, and, perhaps most significantly, Walters had 
not yet obtained a permit from the State of Idaho for an access to connect with the South 
Yellowstone Highway (State Highway 191). Consider these comments made by Walters' attorney: 
46 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Walter's Concrete Request for Zone Change, February 28,2005, p.25, 
LL.22 through p.26, LL. 1-3. 
47 R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE Walter S Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28,2005, p.43, LL.18 
through p.44, LL.2. 
48 As stated by Walter's attorney: "Don't want to share a road with Edstroms. I want to make sure this is clear. You 
can appreciate-tint of all, that was not the context, at least that's not what I meant. If you go back to the picture, obviously what 
I'm doing here, if you come across here from Edstrom's and go across, you realize that you've done to a gravel pit if you haven't 
had a road through there. We've already conceded and said all this can he commercial, we'll do that because that was your plan, 
but to do the other, in essence, takes it right in half-gosh, then sure, we might as well walk way and I'm sure some would say 
great. That certainly guts the whole intent of this." R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE Walter $ Concrete Comprehensive Plan 
Change, February 28, 2005, p.47, LL.17-25 through p.48, LL. 1-4. 
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Another issue is vehicle travel. We have already acknowledged and recognize that 
we would wish to, ifwe can, have the flexibility of course, but wish to go to the road, 
to the State road, just as easy and fast as possible. The interesting part of it depends 
on whose routes you're going. Some people want to enter the State highway 
immediately west of the property, others want us to go south of the property because 
if that's the interchange they want to get us on the State highway faster than the 
County highway-well, I guess they're both State highways-in other words, the dual 
lane highway rather than the other one. . . . We don't know where the exchange is 
going to be yet. We don't know what kind of constraints we're going to have. 
Obviously, you can appreciate that he needs to keep the flexibility there, . . . .49 
First of all, as to the issue of traveling down 4700 . As we said in the Planning and 
Zoning and we say here. It is not the intent to go down 4700, especially past those 
homes. The only question here is an exit strategy, which is best. Until the off ramp 
is actually made, there is no way to know that. . 
For the purpose of leaving the property, I guess that I didn't make it clear enough. 
Mr. Walters does fully intend, if he can, to exit by way of the State Highway. 
Obviously, that still requires a permit from the State Highway. Until the State 
Highway actually makes a determination as to whether or not there is going to be an 
exit from the dual lane highway, kind of puts us in a bad position." 
Traffic and safety were certainly significant issues with the Walters proposal. Yet, even so, 
the Commission did not require traffic studies, reports, counts, etc. It is arbitrary and capricious for 
the County to have such differing standards on this issue depending upon whether or not the 
applicant before it is already a member of the local community. 
In summary, Burns had an entrance constructed by the Idaho Transportation Department 
("ITD") as its access, which still meets all state and federal standards:' while Walters did not have 
any designated access. This fact very clearly evidences the Commission's results-oriented motives 
49 Id, atp.10, LL. 21-25throughp.11,LL. 1-15. 
50 Id, at p.45 LL.10-15. 
51 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE WaNer's Concrete Requestfor Zone Change, February 28,2005, p.28, 
LL. 15-23. 
52 R. Vol. 4. Burns 8 at p.20, LL. 5-10. 
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as to the Bums application, and the County's attempt to downplay concerns for traffic and safety 
expressed by Madison County's residents in regards to the Walters application is neither a fair nor 
accurate assessment of the record. 
4. The Commission's Claim That SixIndustrial Properties Already Existed 
in the Areas Surrounding the Wafters Property Is Not Accurate. 
Idaho law mandates the creation of a comprehensive plan separate from a zoning ~rdinance.'~ 
The comprehensive plan reflects the "desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations" 
for land within ajuri~diction.'~ Further, "[a] comprehensive plan is not a legally controlling zoning 
law, it serves as a guide to local government agencies charged with making zoning  decision^."^^ 
In its attempt to distinguish the Burns and Walters applications, the Commission has focused 
on one single aspect of the Comprehensive Plan and used that aspect in its land use planning while 
ignoring other aspects of the Comprehensive Plan. The principle in the Comprehensive Plan cited 
by the Commission is that "[tlhe County will encourage the grouping of industrial uses . . . ."56 AS 
to Waiters, the Commission has argued that the Walters' project would be located in an area with 
six supposed existing industrial uses, and this fact justifies the County's decision as to both Bums 
and Walters: 
Six industrial areas exist within the surrounding area: Mountain West Bark, 
commonly referred to as the bark plant, is in an industrial zone located to the North 
of the site, Westem Fence, Inc., is a non-conforming use located West of the site; 
Bench Mark Potato is a non-conforming use located West by South West of the site; 
53 See I ~ m o  CODE 9 67-6508. 
54 IDAHO CODE $67-6508; Whiffed v. Cunyon County Board of Commissioners, 137 Idaho 118, 122,44 P.3d 1173, 
1177 (2002). 
5 5  Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76,73 P.3d 84,89 (2003). 
56 R. Exhibit I8 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan) at 17. 
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Mr. Drive Line is a non-conforming use located South of the site; Edstrom gravel pit 
is a non-conforming use located East by North East of the site.57 
This statement is inaccurate and misleading. 
The only zoned industrial area close to Walters is aportion of the property where Mountain 
West Bark is located.58 Mountain West Bark was a pre-existing industrial use that was 
"grandfathered" by the County. The property was not planned for industrial use, and the owner has 
since spread onto property that is not zoned industrial, which has raised serious concerns with 
neighboring  landowner^.'^ Furthermore, Western Fence, Inc., Bench Mark Potato, Mr. Drive Line, 
and Edstrom's gravel pit (which operates under a "grandfathered" Conditional Use Permit) are not 
located on industrial zoned property. In fact, these are commercial businesses, and not industrial 
sites. Thus, the only industrial area close to Walters is the "grandfathered" industrial portion of the 
Mountain West Bark property.60 There has therefore been no "grouping" of industrial uses as argued 
by the Commission. 
Further, if the Commission's logic is followed, the Burns parcel is likewise grouped with 
other industrial uses as it is located next to the Cornielson gravel pit. If the Commission were 
consistent in this standard, then Burns would likewise meet this provision of the Comprehensive 
57 Reply Brief at 38; See also R. Exhibit, Findings of Fact, Conclusiom ofLaw andDecision of the Board of CounQ 
Commissioners of Madison County, Idaho, RE: Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Light Industrial 
Zone Near State Highway 191. April 11,2005, at 13-14. 
58 R. Burns 15 at 4. The small light industrial portion is on the northeast portion of the property. 
59 See generally the testimony of citizens contained in the public hearings transcripts involving Walter's in regards to 
the Mountain West bark plant. For examples, see the testimony of Lou Cameron found at R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE: 
Walter's Concrete Comprehenrive Plan Change, February 28,2005, at p.41, LL.4 through p.42, LL. 12, and the testimony of 
Cort Black found at R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE: Walter's Concrete Request for Zone Change, February 28,2005, 
at p.15, LL.22 through p.16, LL. 17. 
60 R. Burns 15 at 4. See also R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE: Walter's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p.18, LL.16-21. 
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Plan. Thus, on this "grouping" issue, a different standard was applied to Walters than to Bums, and 
the County's unsubstantiated claim as to the grouping of industrial uses does not explain the 
justification for differing treatment. 
However, even if Burns did not comply with the grouping provision of the Comprehensive 
Plan, failure to comply with this single provision of the Comprehensive Plan is not fatal to the Bums 
application. In its review of the Bums application, the Commission is simply required to look at all 
facets of the Comprehensive Plan and assure that the Bums proposal fits within all of the various 
considerations set forth in the plan. It is not uncommon that a proposed development of a piece of 
property may not agree with every single provision in the Comprehensive Plan. These principles 
were discussed in the case of Urruita v. Blaine Cou~ ty .~ '  
In Urruita, the applicant proposed the subdividing of his property, which was rejected by the 
Blaine County Commission because, in its view, it did not support agriculture, aprinciple articulated 
in the Blaine County Comprehensive Plan. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court held the 
following: 
The question presented is what is meant by the phrase in the subdivision ordinance 
requiring the Board to determine that the land to be subdivided "shall conform to the 
Comprehensive Plan." This requirement requires only that the land to be subdivided 
comports with the overall goals of the comprehensive plan. Blaine County's 
comprehensive plannot only discusses the importance of agriculture to the area, but 
also sets forth guidelines regarding economic development,housing, land use, public 
services, facilities and utilities and recreation, among others. 
61 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (2000). 
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In determining whether the land "conforms to the comprehensive plan" for the 
purposes of a subdivision application, the Board is simply required lo look at all 
facets of the comprehensive plan and assure that the land fits within all of the 
various considerations set forth in the plan. It is to be expected that the land to 
be subdivided may not agree with all provisions in the comprehensive plan 
. . . 
62 
Thus, it is not appropriate for the Commission to single out one provision of the 
Comprehensive Plan to justify an intended result. Rather, the Commission is supposed to determine 
if the Bums application complies overall with the various considerations set forth in the plan, even 
though it is possible that the application may not meet all of those provisions. As set forth in this 
brief, the Bums parcel does comply overall with the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan 
5. The Walters Property Is Not Located Within the City Limits of the City 
of Rexburg. 
In another inaccurate statement made by the Commission, it has argued that the Walters 
project was approved because it is ''m city limits, bounded by a railroad line, where six other 
industrial sites, including one gravel pit already are in existence, is in full compliance with the 
comprehensive plan."63 However, just as with its claim that Walters is grouped with other industrial 
users, the claim that the Walters property is within Rexburg city limits is simply untrue. In fact, as 
previously acknowledged by the Commission itself, the Walters property is located "outside the area 
of city impact of the City of Re~burg . "~~  Indeed, if Walters was requesting a land use change and 
62 Id at 357-59,2 P.3d at 742-44 (2000) (emphasis added). 
63 Respondent's Brief at 16-17 (emphasis added). 
64 R. Exhibit, Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw andDecision ofthe Board ofCounp Commissioners ofMadison 
Counry, Idaho, R E  Comprehensive Plan Zone Change to Add a Commercial and a Light Induslrial Zone Near Stale Highway 
191, April 1 1 ,  2005, at 14 (the Commission's Written Decision on the Walters Application). 
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its property was located within the City of Rexburg city limits, it would have had to apply to the City 
of Rexburg for the land use change.65 
The Commission has apparently made this claim in light of the following Comprehensive 
Plan provision: 
The majority of industrial uses shall be located within area of impacts where city services are 
more likely available.66 
In its haste to justify the Walters decision, and claim that the Walters proposal fully complied with 
the Comprehensive Plan, the County has misstated where the Walters property is located. Thus, not 
only is the Walters property located outside of both Rexburg and Rexburg's area of city impact, the 
Walters property was not even adjacent to the area of city impact-in fact, it is miles from the city 
impact area boundary. 
Conversely, the Bums site is located next to the area of city impact for Rexburg, just across 
Highway 20 from the northem border of the area of city impact. The issue of city services was not 
significant to Burns' proposed rezone because of its location and the present location of those 
services on the south side of the North Interchange. In fact, at the time Bums filed its application 
with the County, there had been discussions that either Rexburg or Sugar City could include the 
Burns site in their impact areas in the near future. Nevertheless, the Commission determined that 
approval of the Burns application would be contrary to the Comprehensive Plan because it was not 
65 The application filed by Waiters was, of course, with Madison County, not the City of Rexburg. See R. Vol. 4 
Walters 1 
66 R. Exhibit 18 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan) at 17. 
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located within an area of city impact. Based on this rationale, however, the Walters proposal should 
likewise not have been allowed. Nevertheless, because the Commission applied ad hoc standards, 
it concluded that Bums failed to meet this provision of the Comprehensive Plan, while Walters did 
meet this provision, going so far as to claim the Walters property was located within Rexburg in 
order to justify its decision. This is obviously inaccurate and contrary to the record and further 
indicative of the Commission's biased results-oriented process. 
6. The Commission's Claim That Mr. Pline's Report Appears to Have Been 
Prepared Prior to the Decision of Burns to Add Commercial Businesses 
to the Site Is Not Supported by the Record. 
In its continuing effort to discredit the report prepared by Mr. Pline, the Commission has 
argued that "Mr. Pline's report also appears to have been prepared prior to the decision of Bums to 
add commercial businesses to the site, since the report stated that, 'future development of the 
remaining property at the site is undetermined at this time."'67 This is not true, and furthermore, does 
not tarnish Mr. Pline's analysis. 
Pline's report wasprepared after the Taylor application hearings, where Planning and Zoning 
suggested, after the Commission denied the proposal to zone the entire site industrial, that the site 
should include acommercial buffer. As to commercial traffic, Mr. Pline explained why he couldnot 
analyze future commercial traffic: 
67 Respondent's Brief at 24. The Commission has criticized Mr. Pline for misstating the speed limit through the 
North ~nterchange, hut this is not a fair criticism of Mr. Pline. The context in which Mr. Pline inisstated the speed limit was not 
related to his analvsis of the Burns site. rather. it was a sueeestion to lower the soeed limit bv 10 mnh throueh the North "- - 
Interchange to address concerns individuals had about speeding motorists through the area. 
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It is recognized that the Concrete Batch Plant development uses only aportion of the 
site. However, the future development of the remaining property at the site is 
indeterminate at this time. The future development of the remaining property, type 
of development, traffic generation and roadway impacts will have to be addressed at 
a later time when that development request is ~ubmitted.~' 
Further, commercial traffic did not appear to be a significant issue because the Comprehensive Plan 
states that commercial uses should be placed along transportation corridors or State  highway^.'^ 
Although Burns incorporated the commercial buffer in response to the suggestion from 
Planning and Zoning, the Commission now criticizes Burns for not providing more detailed traffic 
information for the commercial buffer Planning and Zoning proposed . In fact, the Commission 
relied upon this criticism as a basis for its disapproval of the Burns application even though no traffic 
analysis at all was required for the similar Walters appli~ation.'~ Also based on Planning and 
Zoning's suggestion, Walters had amended its application to include a commercial buffer around its 
industrial zone, which was approved without the Commission even questioning future commercial 
traffic. 
68 R. Exhibit 12 Tab 3 at *2. 
69 R. Exhibit 18 (Madison County Comprehensive Plan) at 16. 
70 Walters' attorney testified as follows: 
Elowever, the Planning and Zoning, in the first hearing that we had before them, the P&Z suggested that you, the 
Commissioners, had done a very Comprehensive Plan years ago and then part of that you felt like a corridor of the 
commercial designation to the extent that you are seeing here was justified, and in essence, is something that overall, 
because not knowing where the highway will have its exits, not knowing what is going to happen on that corridor, a 
commercial zoning would be significant arid more appropriate. 
[Llet's go to the commercial first of all, . . .I think its' important to know that the commercial was followed precisely with 
your overall Comprehensive Plan that you put together anumber ofyears ago, . . . .Mr. Walters, in his original application 
did not have that, but felt that he could work and still make this thing work in keeping in harmony with that request. As 
a maner of fact, it was brought up by Mr. Jeppesen, who was on the Planning and Zoning and used to be on the 
Commission, he felt that was avery important issue, so that is wily the change was made. R. Exhibit, Public Hearing RE: 
Waller's Concrete Comprehensive Plan Change, February 28,2005, at p.7 LL. 21-25 tllrough p.8 LL. 1-6; p.5 LL. 3-1 7. 
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In sum, there can be no legitimate explanation ibr why the County would suggest the 
inclusion of commercial property as encouraged by the Comprehensive Plan in Bums' proposal and 
then disallow the proposal because of the perceived traffic issues from the commercial property, 
while at the same time approving the Walters proposal and its commercial buffer without any 
identification of specific commercial uses that would locate there or any traffic analysis at all. 
7. Pline Did Not "Ignore the Warnings of Mr. Dyer," W h o  Prepared an 
Earlier Assessment of the North Interchange. 
In Respondent's Briei; the Commission contends that Mr. Dyer issued a warning that Mr. 
Pline ignored." However, the quotation offered by the Commission to support its contention simply 
states Mr. Dyer's concern about apotential sight-distance problem where traffic in the proposed left- 
turn bay north of the North Interchange would obstruct views of southbound traffic, and his 
conclusion that the potential problem "further justiflies] keeping the [Bums] approach to the 
north."72 To the extent the Commission claims that Burns did not work to keep the Bums approach 
as far north as possible, the claim is simply wrong. The recommendations of Mr. Dyer were not 
ignored. To the contrary, they were specifically adopted. 
The Bums parcel was originally part of a larger parcel which was segmented by the U.S. 20 
Rexburg Bypass Relocation. ITD envisioned a frontage road adjacent to Highway 20.73 According 
to Tom Cole, an ITD district engineer, the presently existing access "was designed years ago when 
71 Respondent's Brief at 25. 
72 R. Exhibit 12 at Tab 3 (Letter from Winston Dyer to DaNiel Jose, December 31,2003, a1 p.2). 
73 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLC Requestfor Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, p.9, LL.13-18. 
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the interchange was actually constructed for accessing into that property. It still appears to be a safe 
one based on the criteria in order to get funded through Federal Highway Administration for a project 
such as this."74 
It is important to note that Mr. Dyer's letter was written on December 3 1, 2003 in relation 
to the Taylor hearings. After the Taylor applications were denied, Burns took measures to improve 
the site access by purchasing the property formerly owned by Bruce Shirley. With the purchase of 
this small acreage (approximately two acres), Bums actually improved the original ITD design.75 
The original access to the Burns site was put in place by ITD when it put in the North Interchange 
and it is the only access to the property. The change permitted a more level entrance with better sight 
lines for traffic entering or exiting the Burns facility. Bums also agreed to pay for a left-turn hay. 
For the Commission to state that Burns did nothing to accommodate Mr. Dyer's request is therefore 
plain error, as Bums purchased additional property and obtained an assignment ofthe prior easement 
held by ITD to improve ITD's previous safe design. 
C. Without Substantiating Evidence from Those Testifying at Hearings on the 
Burns Matter, the Principle Articulated in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of 
Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002) Was Not Followed. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the Commission argues that "the credibility of the witnesses and 
evidence was assessed first hand by the [Comrnissi~n]."'~ In support of this argument, the 
74 R. Vol. 4. Burns 8 at p.20, LL. 5-10. 
75 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, R E  Burns Holdings, LLC Request for Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p.5, LL.25 through p.6, LL.8. 
76 Respondent's Brief at 19. 
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Commission argues that, under Rules 701 and 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, once a witness 
has been qualified to testify in a given issue, the weight ultimately assigned to that witness' 
testimony "is left completely to the trier of fact" and "[nleither the Rules of Evidence, nor case law, 
requires a trier of fact to assign more weight to the testimony of an expert as opposed to a lay 
person."77 The Commission, in its briefing, thereafter recounts some testimony from residents about 
their traffic experiences, and then states that there "were numerous exhibits, written documents, and 
tapes entered into evidence for the   commission]'^ review, and the witnesses appeared so the 
[Commission] could assess their credibility f ir~thand."~~ 
This claim is misleading. While there were documents submitted by the residents setting 
forth their opinions on the project in general, in regards to the vital issue of traffic and safety, there 
were no exhibits, accident records from Madison County, photographs, information or studies from 
the State of Idaho, nor any other evidence to support the contentions made by the residents. As to 
the North Interchange in particular, even the County's own Keller Report did not list the North 
Interchange as one of the fifteen highest crash locations in Madison County from 1997 to 2001, nor 
was the North Interchange mentioned as a problem area.79 It is important to note that in the analysis 
prepared by Keller Associates, these engineers performed the following analysis as to accident data 
for Madison County: 
In order to complete the safety analysis, raw crash data was requested from the Idaho 
Office of Highway Safety. This data consists of a short paragraph describing 
77 Id at 20. 
78 Id. 
79 See R. Exhibit 10, Keller Report, at p. 2-33 through 2-36. 
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accident location, the day, time of day, road surface conditions, vehicle type, driver 
age, weather conditions, road surface conditions, contributing crash circumstances, 
and other pertinent information." 
Without supporting evidence on an issue such as traffic and safety, such as the accident data 
obtained by Pline and Keller Associates, the evidence presented by the residents-and relied upon 
whole-heartedly by the Commission-is clearly anecdotal, meaning it is based on perception or 
hearsay only, and not on proven facts or analysis offered to support that perception.8' Put another 
way, it is based on personal opinion and emotion. 
Consider that among the claims of the residents were that (1) one witness could not get his 
truck up to fifteen miles per hour when he exited his property and hit the top of the North 
Interchange (a distance of over 800 feet, or nearly three football fields)," or (2) that there had been 
"15 accidents" on the Salem Road, or (3) that there had been "six major accidents and one or two 
minor onesmx3 on Salem Road. There was no evidence or information submitted supporting any of 
these oral claims. Those county residents claiming a far greater number of accidents at the North 
Interchange than identified in any of the expert reports could have requested supporting 
documentation from the Madison County Sheriffs Office, the Idaho State Police, the Idaho Office 
of Highway Safety, or other agencies-all ofwhich is readily available to the Commission-supporting 
80 id. at 2-33 through 2-24. 
- 
81 Anecdotal is defined as: "I. pertaining to, resembling or containing anecdotes. 2. based on incidental observations 
or reports rather than systematic evaluation." WEBSTER'S UNMRSAL COLiEGEDlCTlONARY at 30 (2001). 
82 While it is difficult to tell strictly from the written words of the record, it does not appear that Mr. Val Ball, who 
make this statement, meant it literally when he stated he could not get his vehicle up to 15 mph by the time he hit the middle of 
the North Interchange. Mr. Ball's driveway is just north of and across the Salem Road from the Burns parcel, which is over 800 
feet from the top of the North Interchange. The County has apparently concluded that he meant this statement literally, which 
seems to be a misuse of this statement. 
83 Respondent's Brief at 27. 
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their contention that a number of accidents at the North Interchange were either not reported to ITD 
or not documented. This was not done. Testimony was presented, but no evidence or exhibits 
supporting that testimony was provided, which is contrary to the principle articulated in Evans v. 
Board of Commissioners ofcassia County. Thus, the testimony provided by those opposed to the 
Burns application can only be considered objections based on personal opinion and emotion rather 
than on the Comprehensive Plan and violations of its policies. In Evans v. Teton County, the Idaho 
Supreme Court discounted these types of objections, which are "based on personal opinion and 
emotion."84 
Burns contends it is only reasonable to require some kind ofdocumented evidence to support 
adverse claims made on an issue that does, in fact, have documents to support it, when a project 
proponent's experts have documented the existing conditions. Thus, when it comes to accidents, 
speeding, and claims of a dangerous traffic situation, there are independent and unbiased sources to 
which parties can turn in order to verify their perceptions, including the County's own accident and 
traffic records and the Keller Report. Without requiring this type of evidence to support oral claims 
on issues that have an independent and unbiased method of documenting the issue, a County's sole 
reliance on "personal opinion and emotion" should constitute a violation of the rule articulated in 
the Evans case. Put otherwise, if the County is allowed to rely on anecdotal information only, then 
the Commission could literally decide a matter on anything said at a land use hearing, no matter how 
84 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,77,73 P.3d 84,90 (2003). 
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meritless. This hardly inspires confidence in the land use process, nor does it satisfy "fundamental 
fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making,"s5 which the LLUPA emphasizes. 
Additionally, we would note that the personal opinions and emotion of individuals can 
change for any reason, and this makes such opinions and emotion unreasonable torely upon when 
making a land use decision. Consider, for example, minutes of testimony presented by Bruce Shirley 
in 2003 in regards to development of the North Interchange when he was the applicant for a 
Comprehensive Plan and zone change involving the Bums parcel: 
Mr. Shirley stated that he was responsible for selling the property and the first 
commercial venture considered for this property was a truck stop. He reported that 
he had looked at the area and felt it would be safe for commercial use and the seven 
seconds anticipated to make a traffic decision in this area would be sufficient. He 
also felt there was good visibility and was not sure why this comlnercial zone change 
process was so hard. As he listened to the discussion between the P & Z 
Commission members, he was concerned about their discussioil of this change 
affecting the homes around the golf course. He stated that this was a practical 
approach and is a normal place for business to go. . . He wanted to endorse this 
proposals6 
And compare Mr. Shirley's above statement with statements he made at the Comprehensive Plan 
hearing on the Bums application: 
Not only are we strongly opposed because of our personal reasons, but we feel it is 
against the laws and ordinances that are currently on the books of Madison County. 
6 e  State of Idaho has delegated the local to adopt regulations designed 
to promote public health, safety and general welfare of its citizenry. We feel that the 
85 IDAHO CODE $67-6535(c) (emphasis added). 
86 R. Burns 2 at 3. (emphasis added) 
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proposed changes are against the charges that the State of Idaho has so faithfully 
passed on to our local governn~ent.~' 
Mr. Shirley thereafter submitted his specific opposition in writing, which is found at R. Vol. 4 Burns 
10. As shown by this example, opinions and emotion can shift easily and quickly, which is why it 
is imperative that land use bodies base their decisions on hard evidence and not on personal opinion 
and emotion. 
Despite the lack of hard evidence to support the residents' claims, despite Planning and 
Zoning's findings of fact, and despite the expert reports, the Commission states that the unsupported 
testimony of the residents "carried significant weight" with the Comrni~sion."~~ The Commission's 
whole-hearted reliance on the unsupported oral testimony which was contradicted by professional, 
expert testimony is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and fbrther demonstrates that 
the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 
D. A Substantial Right of Burns Has Been Prejudiced. A Takings Analysis Is Not 
the Proper Analysis for Determination of Whether a Substantial Wight of Burns 
Has Been Violated. 
The County maintains that no substantial right of Burns has been violated, yet in doing so 
it is has not addressed the arguments contained in Burns' opening brief, which are based on Idaho 
case law. As explained before, the LLUPA adopts the judicial review provisions of the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act (the "IDAPA") for review of zoning board decisions.89 When judicial 
87 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings, LLC Request far Comprehensive Plan Change, 
February 28,2005, at p.17, LL.22 through p.18, LL.5. 
88 Respondent's Brief at 11. 
89 Friend of Farm to Market v. Valley Counfy, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
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review of LLUPA decisions is undertaken, "a local agency making a land use decision, such as the 
Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under IDA PA."^' Judicial review is a 
two-step process, wherein "[tlhe party appealing the Board of Commissioners' decision must first 
show the Board of Commissioners erred in a manner specifi ed under I.C. 5 67-5279(3), and second, 
that a substantial right has been prej~diced."~' 
From the beginning, Burns has claimed that it has had substantial rights violated because the 
Commission has been arbitrary and capricious in its decision-making, and has made factual findings 
which are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. These errors have resulted in a 
decision in which the Commission did not evaluate the Burns application properly. 
One ofthe Idaho cases specifically discussing the substantial rights issue, Sanders Orchard 
1). Gem C o ~ n t ~ ~ ~  was discussed in detail in Appellant's Opening Brief. In the Sanders Orchard 
case, the Gem County Commissioners relied upon apurported fact to form the basis of their decision 
relative to a proposed subdivision. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court found that no written 
documents or oral testimony was submitted regarding the purported fact that the City of Emmett's 
central sewer and water lines would be extended to the subdivision in the reasonably near future. 
The court held that the commission's findings were therefore not supported by substantial evidence. 
In addition, because no evidence was presented as to the sewer and water extension, the court held 
that "substantial rights of Sanders Orchard have been prejudiced by the Board's action in basing its 
90 Evans v. Tefon County, 139 Idaho 71,74,73 P.3d 84,87 (2003). 
91 Id. at 75-76,73 P.3d at 74-75; See also I D M  CODE 8 67-5279(4). 
92 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002). 
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decision on an issue upon which no evidence was presented."93 As a result, the court vacated the 
commission's decision. Sanders Orchard therefore holds that there is sufficient prejudice to the 
substantial rights of an applicant if a county bases its decision on a finding which was not supported 
by evidence in the record. This is precisely what occurred with Burns. 
In Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia C o ~ n & ~  the appellants claimed that the 
Cassia County Commissioner's visit to aproposed use site, "without notice to or the presence of the 
interested parties, was adue process violation amounting to improper procedure."95 The Court stated 
that "[tlhere was substantial evidence presented at the hearing upon which the Board could have 
based its decision, wholly independently from the visit to the p r~pe r ty . "~~  After noting its duty to 
view the proceedings and decisions of a commission "with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and 
the essentials of reasoned decision-making," the court concluded that "whatever knowledge the 
Board may have gained from visiting the property was not necessary to form the basis of its decision, 
as the hearing yielded substantially the same evidence as could have been garnered during the 
visit."97 AS a result, the court concluded that no substantial rights had been violated. 
In the recently-decided case of Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofsun the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined whether or not the Sun Valley city council unreasonably interpreted its 
ordinances to require the landowner to submit a particular application in order to construct a road 
93 Id. at 703, 52 P.3d at 847. 
94 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002). 
95 id. at 432, 50 P.3d at 447. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 2007WL4531556. 
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to the landowner's property. When this Court determined that the City of Sun Valley had indeed 
unreasonably interpreted its ordinances, the Court held the following: 
Lane Ranch has a substantial right to have its application evaluated properly under 
Title 7 of the Code. Their ability to access their property has been impeded and they 
are unable to develop their property for admittedly permissible uses under the 
applicable OR-1 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a substantial right of had been violated because the 
application was not "evaluated properly." This is precisely what occurred with Burns. 
The cases discussed above and the language of Idaho Code fi 67-5279(4) itself suggest that 
the substantial rights test under this statute is, in essence, a "harmless error" exception allowing the 
courts to overlook technical errors where no real harm was done. If it can be shown that the error 
would not have changed the outcome or was not necessary to form the basis of a Commission's 
decision, then a court may conclude that no substantial right was violated. 
In response to Burns' claim that is has had substantial rights violated, the Commission has 
claimed that substantial rights have not been violated unless the harm done to the applicant is 
takings-like. In discussing the substantial right issue, the County states that "[tlhere is also similarity 
in "takings" cases, where a regulation denies an owner of all economically viable use of land," and 
further that a taking "would be violative of a substantial right."loO 
99 Id. at *4. 
100 Respondent's Brief at 30. 
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As an initial matter, there is no Idaho case that equates violation of a substantial right with 
a "takings" analysis. Indeed, in the Sanders Orchard v. Gem County case, lo' discussed above, there 
was no discussion of a taking, yet the court still found that a substantial right had been violated. 
Sanders Orchard holds that there is sufficient prejudice to the substantial rights of an applicant if 
a county bases its decision on a finding which was not supported by evidence in the record. This is 
precisely what has occurred with Burns on a number of issues. This Court held similarly in the Lane 
Ranch Partnership case. Nor was there any discussion of a taking in Evans v. Board of 
Commissioners of Cassia County.'02 Although these cases do not contain the only instances where 
substantial rights were alleged to have been violated, they support Burns' contention concerning the 
substantial rights test. 
It is clear that this Court will be the fact-finder in deciding whether Bums has had a 
substantial right or rights violated. However, as discussed above, Idaho cases on this issue do exist 
and are instructive and binding and should control the analysis of the substantial rights issue. The 
Commission's argument that takings law ought to be used to interpret the term "substantial rights" 
is simply misplaced. 
Further, it is disingenuous for the Commission to claim that "Burns knew the property's use 
and purchased it afier prior requests to change the comprehensive plan designation of the property 
had been denied."'03 Proposed development of the Burns parcel had been denied for an entirely 
101 137 Idaho 695,52 P.3d 840 (2002). 
102 137 Idaho 428, 50 P.3d 443 (2002). 
103 Respondent's Brief at 31. 
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commercial proposal and for an entirely industrial proposal. Burns thereafter worked with Planning 
and Zoning, and based upon Planning and Zoning's suggestion, made a proposal for a small 
industrial area surrounded by a commercial buffer. Thus, after years of working with Madison 
County, it appeared that the appropriate combination of commercial and industrial uses was proposed 
at the North Interchange. Madison County also made the same suggestion to Walters, who then 
revised its application to incorporate this suggestion before obtaining the Commission's approval.'04 
Additionally Burns commissioned a traffic study to review all relevant reports and information to 
refute the traffic concerns raised during the hearings. 
Yet the Commission now argues that Bums should have known that the property would not 
be allowed for development because proposals for development had been denied previously. This 
ignores all of the work Burns undertook to cooperate and work with Madison County, something this 
Court found important in Evans v. Teton County, where the Court noted that "[tlhe record indicates 
throughout this process Teton Springs adjusted its application in order to meet the requirenlerlts 
demanded by the Zoning Commis~ion."'~~ The Commission's claim ignores the cooperative nature 
of Burns, and further evidences the Commission's results-oriented decision. 
For the foregoing reasons, Burns' substantial rights have been prejudiced by the Commission. 
The Commission made its findings and conclusions relative to traffic and other issues which were 
only supported by unsubstantiated "personal opinion and emotion" where professional, expert 
104 Compare R. Vol. 4 Wallers 1 with R. Vol. 4 Walters 5. See also R. Exhibit Public Ifearing Transcript, RE: 
Walter's Concrete Requestfor Zone Change, February 28, 2005, p.5 LL. 12-17 (testimony of Walters' counsel describing 
reasons for amending the Waltcr application). 
105 Evans v. Teton Couniy, 139 Idaho 71,77,73 P.3d 84,90 (2003). 
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testimony had established the true facts. Furthermore, the Commission was entirely arbitrary and 
capricious in deciding the Walters and Burns matters as it has. These are not harmless errors. Burns 
has had substantial rights violated by the results-oriented decision of the Commission. 
E. Approval of the Burns Application Would Not Be an Illegal Spot Zone. 
The Commission argues that approval of the Burns application would be an illegal spot zone. 
This argument was never raised in the Planning and Zoning hearings and was not listed as a basis 
for denial of the Burns application by the Commission in its first written decision when it denied 
Burns' application, a decision that was appealed to the district court and remanded to the 
Commission. Moreover, there was no discussion of spot zoning at the April 13,2006 hearing on 
remand, yet in the Commission's June 1,2006 written decision, spot zoning was listed as a basis for 
denial of the Bums application.lo6 
Further, the Commission stated previously on the record that the Bums proposal was not a 
spot zone. Consider this statement from Commissioner Passey: 
Also, Mr. Parkinson stated that we can't allow spot zoning and those types 
of things to happen throughout the County, yet we don't have enough industrial 
zoning available, so we have got to create pockets throughout the County or in one 
part of the County whenever we decide, or Planning and Zoning decides to do it. 
Whether this is the place that is chosen or not, because of the lack of 
commercial and industrial in the County, then we have to address certain pockets or 
106 R. Vol. 4 Burns 29; Specifically, compare the first written decision found at R. Vol. 4 Burns 29 at 39 (the 
discussion of "Land Use") and the second written decision found at R. Exhibit Findinas ofFac1, Conclusions ofLaw and 
Decision of the Board of county Commissioners of Madison Counfy. Idaho, RE: Comprehensive Plan Map change to Amend a 
Propzrr~ U~.stgiu!,o,,/ru,n .~lgrr,~~~lr~cn,/ to (.'onr,,rzrr.,ol o,zJ 1.1ghl Indt~strral .'ieur tllr Yortlr I~rte~cl~o~igz , I /  I!S tftglril<~, ?(., 
lulle 1. 2006. at ? I  tthe d!j?il~sldn uf'I.nnd Use3'l Onl\ the sccond rlec~slu~l references rout rolilne. an i r i u i  that U ~ L F  not 
-. 
discussed at the 13,2006 hearing on remand, a transcript of which is found in the record at. R. Exhibit Public Meeting, RE 
Burn's [sic] Holdings, LLC, April 13, 2006. 
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spots in the County. It's where we choose a Trans Ag out in the middle of the 
agriculture that has no bearing. That's where we have concerns about spot zoning.'07 
Burns does not understand the Commission's change in position on this issue. In any event, this is 
an argument that has no merit. 
In support of its claim that the Burns application would amount to a spot zone, the 
Commission states that the Burns site is on farm ground, and that the Commission has an obligation 
to protect such farm ground from development.'" The Commission also stresses that the property 
is not within an area of city impact, nor are there any light industrial or commercial parcels in the 
vicinity of the Burns parcel. Response to these arguments are set forth above, and do not need to be 
repeated here.loP Lastly, the Commission states that "it is impossible to comply with the Madison 
County comprehensive plan by placing an industrial use and commercial zone dropped right in the 
middle of a transitionallagricultural 
As an initial matter, Burns would simply invite the court to consider these statements in light 
of the Walters decision, particularly as to the County's claim that it has a duty to protect agricultural 
and residential properties. Thus, the Walters proposal sought the rezone of over 130 acres of farm 
ground, and the result was a "drop" of industrial property into an agriculturallresidential area. 
107 R. Exhibit Public Hearing Transcript, RE Burns Holdings. LLC Requestfor Zone Change, February 28,2005, at 
p.35, LL. 1-14. 
108 Respondent's Brief at 34. 
109 See Section ILB.5 above. 
I10 Respondent's Brief at 35. 
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More importantly, however, the claims made the Commission quoted above illustrate how 
the Commission has arbitrarily relied on select provisions of the Comprehensive Plan with Burns 
while ignoring other equally important provisions. As noted in the Urrutia case quoted above, it is 
to be expected that land subject to a proposed change "may not agree with all provisions of the 
comprehensive plan,""' but may still be allowed ifthe proposed change comports generally with the 
Comprehensive Plan. Moreover, the Comprehensive Plan is not a zoning document; it is a planning 
document. There is no Idaho case or statute providing for a spot zone analysis in the context of a 
comprehensive plan amendment. 
The Commission has therefore missed the mark in its analysis of what constitutes a spot 
zone. A claim that a local planning authority has engaged in spot zoning is nothing more than a 
claim that it has failed to zone in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan, as required under Idaho 
Code 3 67-65 1 1 ."2 Zoning is not in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan if the zoning "singles 
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for 
the benefit of an individual property ~wner.""~ 
The Commission argues that the Burns proposal would be a "type-two" spot zone under the 
principles articulated in Evans v. Teton County, as, the Commission argues, it would "single out a 
parcel of land use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit 
I l l  Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,357-59,2 P.3d 738,742-44 (2000). 
112 Price v. Payette County Board ofCounty Commissioners, 13 1 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583 (1998); Sprenger, Grubb 
and Associates, Inc. v. City ofHailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). 
113 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76,73 P.3d 84,89 (2003). 
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of an individual property o ~ n e r . " " ~  The Commission argues that this is the case because "it is 
impossible to comply with the Madison County comprehensive plan by placing an industrial use and 
commercial zone dropped right in the middle of a transitional/agricultural zone." 
The Commission's claim is not correct. A "type-one" spot zone is considered a reference 
"to a rezoning of property for a use prohibited by the original zoning classification" and is legal if 
it "is in accord with the comprehensive plan." 'I5 Thus, the spot zoning of property "is not per se 
illegal, but rather illegal only if lacking a reasonable ba~is.""~ This embodies Idaho's principle 
articulated above that a claim that a local planning authority has engaged in spot zoning is nothing 
more than a claim that it has failed to zone in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan, as required 
under Idaho Code 5 67-65 1 1. 
The Bums proposal would be a legal type-one spot zone. As we have argued at length in the 
above Section I1.B. 1, the Burns proposal complies with the Comprehensive Plan. Further, it meets 
the general provisions for growth at the North Interchange. Both the City of Rexburg and Planning 
and Zoning agree with this assessment. 
In addition, however, the County has failed to adequately plan for industrial zones in 
Madison County, as noted by Commissioner Pas~ey."~ The County's failure to plan should not 
equate to penalizing landowners such as Burns for proposing land use changes to allow for such 
uses. In fact, all of the current industrial sites were preexisting uses that existed before the county 
114 Respondent's Brief at 35. 
1 IS Evans, 139 Idaho at 77 ,73  P.3d at 90. 
1 16 MCQUULAN'S MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Q: 25.84 (2000). 
117 See footnote 107 above. 
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adopted its Comprehensive Plan. The lack of zoning has prevented anyone from coming into 
Madison County to develop industrial uses to compete with other existing industrial uses, a practice 
that is contrary to the Comprehensive Plan goal "[tlo improve and diversify the local economy and 
create jobs for area residents, promoting high quality community growth that emphasizes better pay, 
better public facilities, and a diverse, stable business en~ironrnent.""~ The County's failure to plan 
should not equate to penalizing landowners such as Burns for proposing land use changes to allow 
for such uses consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. 
In Respondent's Brief, the Commission has made a conclusion that approval of the Burns 
application would be a "type-two" spot zone without going through the appropriate analysis. It has 
not presented sufficient evidence to support a claim that approval of the Burns application would not 
be in accordance with the Madison County Comprehensive Plan. In making its claim that it cannot 
"drop" a commercial/industrial parcel at the North Interchange, it has simply ignored that the 
property is located next to the major state highway in Madison County, ignored that the 
Comprehensive Plan encourages placement of such properties next to state highways, ignored past 
Madison County practices, and ignored the lack of industrial zoning in Madison County. In short, 
the County has not shown that there are no reasonable bases for allowing the proposed change, and 
therefore has not shown that approving the Burns application would be a type-two illegal spot zone. 
To the contrary, the Burns proposal would be a legal "type-one" spot zone, and this court found 
118 R. Exhibit 18, (Madis011 County Comprehensive Plan), at 13. 
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similarly in the Evans case, when it concluded that the "type-one" spot zoning in that case was 
In short, the spot zoning issue is irrelevant to this court's review and otherwise incorrect. 
Further, there is no distinguishing factor between Bums and Walters that would explain why the 
issue was not raised in the Walters hearing if in fact it had any merit, which it does not 
P. Burns, and Not the Commission, Is Entitled to An Award of Attorney's Pees. 
The Commission argues that Burns is not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code i j  12- 
117, but that the Commission should receive such an award. The law as to an award of attorney's 
fees under this statute was recently summarized in the case of Neighbors for a Healthy GoldFork 
v. Valley County.'20 In Neighhors, the court stated the following: 
To award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-1 17, the Court must not only find that the 
Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, but it must also find in favor 
of the party requesting fees. Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City of 
Boise, 136 Idaho 666,671,39 P.3d 606,611 (2001). The purpose of I.C. i j  12-1 17 
is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary action and to provide a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have 
made. Canal/Norcrest/ColumbusAclion Committee, 136 Idaho at 671,39 P.3d at 61 1 
(citing Rincover v. State, 132 Idaho 547, 549,976 P.2d 473,475 (1999))."' 
Assuming that Bums prevails in this matter, this court will have found that the Commission 
acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact such that a reversal is warranted. If this is the case, 
119 Evans, 139 Idaho at 71,73 P.3d at 90 
120 2007 WL 4531786. 
121 Id. at *16. 
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then it seems rather clear that Bums would likewise be entitled to an award of attorney's fees as it 
has incurred a financial burden in order to correct mistakes that never should have been made, which 
is the very reason for Idaho Code 5 12-1 17. 
Conversely, assuming that the Commission prevails in this matter, the Commission is not 
entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code 5 12-1 17. Bums has presented this court with the 
opportunity to juxtapose two nearly identical land use applications decided at the same time where 
the Commission reached opposite outcomes. This case therefore presents much-needed guidance 
on the arbitrary and capricious standard in the LLUPA. Further, Bums is seeking a clarification and 
expansion of the principles articulated in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Cassia 
Counly, by asking this court to answer the question of what exactly the Evans case requires in the 
context of a land use hearing. 
This Court has held that a party is not entitled to attorney's fees "if the issue is one of first 
impression in Idaho,"'zz and further, if a party presents a "legitimate question for this Court to 
addres~."''~ Because Bums has met these standards with the questions it has presented to this Court, 
an award of fees to the County would not be appropriate under Idaho Code $ 12-1 17 if the County 
were to prevail on this matter. 
122 Lane Ranch Partnership v City ofSun Valley, 2007 W L  4531556 at *4 (quoling SE/Z Const., L.L.C. v Idaho 
State University, 140 Idaho 8, 14, 89 P.3d 848, 854 (2004)). 
123 Id (quoting IHCHospitals, Inc. v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 188, 191-92, 75 P.3d 1198, 1201-02 (2003)). 
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111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the Commission's decision and 
order the amendment requested by Burns to the Comprehensive Plan and zoning as requested in 
Bums' application. In addition, Burns should receive an award of its reasonable attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 2008. 
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